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Summary findings
Virtually  all of the studies  that  quantify  the adjustmetnt  itn manufacturing  employment  in developinig countries  a
costs of trade  liberalization  relativc  to  the benefits  point  year  after  trade  liberalization,  for- thlee  reasonis:
to the conclusion  that  adjustmenit  costs  are small  in  D  Developing  cotutries  tend  to  have comparative
relation  to the benefits  of trade  liberalization.  advantage  in labor-intetnsive  industries,  and trade
The  explanation  for  low  adjustmenit  costs is that:  liberalization  tends  to favor  labor.
*  These  costs are typically  short  term  and end  whcn  *  ]nterindustry  shifts  occur  after  trade  liberalization,
workers  find  a job,  but  the  benefits  grow  as the  economiiy  which  trinimizes  the  dislocation  of factors  of production.
does.  *  In many  industries  noi-rmlal  labor  turnover  exceeds
*  Unemployment  doesn't  last long,  especially  where  dislocation  from  trade  liberalization,  so downsizinig,
workers'  pay was not  substantial  in the  original  job.  when  necessary,  can  be accomplislhed  withotut mutch
*  Normal  labor  turnover  often  exceeds  job  forced  uneimiployment.
displacement  from  trade  liberalization.  Matusz  and Tarr  recommend  a uniform  tariff  to
Moreover,  studies that  examine  the  impact  of trade  minimize  special-initerest  lobbying  for  protection  since  it
liberalization  on employment  in developinig  cotuntries  diffuses  the benefits  of protection.
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Introduction
Economic research has rather well documented the long-term benefits from improved
resource allocation  and  efficiency that  follow  from  trade  reform. And,  although  causation
remains an issue, research has shown strong and consistent correlation between trade reform and
growth. Despite this evidence of improved incomes from trade reform, some policy makers are
reluctant to  implement trade reform due to  fear of excessive adjustment costs. Policy makers
fears may be based in part on political dynamics of reform (politicians in power fear they will
incur the anger of the owners of displaced resources while the benefits may accrue  in  later
years), but may also be based in part on the fact that there is much less written and known on the
subject of the nature, magnitude, and duration of adjustment costs  In this paper we attempt to fill
the  void  in  the  literature  by  surveying  the  evidence  on  the  adjustment  costs  of  trade
liberalization, and placing those estimates of adjustment costs in perspective relative to the gains
from trade liberalization.
The outline of the paper is as follows: in section II we first define adjustment costs,
distinguishing social and private costs of adjustment, and then develop a model for thinking
about adjustment costs. We survey the estimates of adjustment costs, both social and private,  as
well as studies of the employment effects of trade liberalization in section III. In section IV, we
examine  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  on  macro-stability.  In  section  V,  we  provide
suggestions for future research, focusing on means of addressing opposition to reform as well as
reducing the adjustment costs.  Our detailed summary and policy conclusions are in section VI.
Briefly, our results are as follows: while we find that it is necessary to apply caveats to
most of the more than 50 studies we survey, virtually all the studies find that adjustment costs are
very small in relation to the benefits of trade liberalization. And those studies that focused on2
manufacturing employment in developing countries f ound  that it had typically increased within
one year after liberalization. Collectively, the weight of so many studies of various types, all
pointing in more or less the same direction, makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that
adjustment costs are relatively very small relative to the benefits of trade liberalization and after
the economy has one year to adjust to the trade liberalization, we should expect to see an
increase in manufacturing employment.
The explanation for the low adjustment costs in relation to the benefits is as follows: (1)
most importantly, adjustment costs are typically short term and terminate when workers find a
job, while the benefits of trade reform can be expected to grow with the economy; (2) estimates
of the duration of unemployment for workers in most industries are not high, especially where
workers were not earning substantial rents in the original job; (3) in many industries normal
labor turnover exceeds dislocation from trade liberalization, so that downsizing where necessary
could be accomplished without much forced unemployment; and (4) it has been observed that a
significant  portion of  the  resource reallocation after  trade  liberalization  was  accomplished
through  inter-industry shifts,  which  minimized the  dislocation of  factors of  production.  In
addition,  developing countries  would be  expected to  have comparative  advantage in  labor
intensive  industries,  so  trade  liberalization  should  favor  labor.  This  may  explain  why
manufacturing employment has typically increased after trade liberalization.3
II.  Defining and Modeling Adjustment Costs
A.  Defining Adjustment Costs
One of the basic tenants in economics is that a regime of liberal international trade leads
to a more efficient allocation of resources and higher level of economic well being than does a
regime involving artificial distortions of trade.  There now exists a  voluminous amount of
empirical research supporting this claim. 1 Although there are a number of studies which  we
survey in this paper, by comparison, researchers have spent relatively little time identifying and
quantifying the potential adjustment costs that may be associated with a movement away from a
regime of distorted trade (the status quo) to a more liberal regime.
For purposes of this paper, we define adjustment costs as encompassing a wide variety of
potentially  disadvantageous  short-run outcomes that  might  result  from  trade  liberalization.
These outcomes may include a reduction in employment and output, the loss of industry-specific
and  firm-specific human  capital,  and macroeconomic instability  resulting  from  balance  of
payments difficulties or  reductions in government revenue.  In  analyzing these  costs,  it  is
important to distinguish between social and private costs. While the social costs of adjustment
are relevant for considering the aggregate welfare effects of trade reform, it is the distribution of
private costs within society that form the basis of political opposition to reform. 2
Even when  the social  benefits of  trade  liberalization outweigh the  social  costs,  the
existence of private costs can easily generate enough political opposition to block any reforms.
The problem is especially evident when protection or liberalization in a particular industry is
considered. Representatives of the industry in question will lobby for protection because the
gains are concentrated in their industry. On the other hand, the consumers of the product who
lose from protection are dispersed throughout the economy. The consumers would like to see4
lobbying against the protection but there is a free rider problem. Individual consumers do not
lose  enough  from the protection  to  induce them to  expend resources to  lobby  against the
protection--rather they would like other consumers to lobby against the protection. A succession
of particular industries lobbying  for protection may then result  in  a protected overall  trade
regime. See Stigler (1971) for an elaboration.
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) have extended this argument by noting even those who will
gain from trade reform may be unwilling to support reform or even oppose it. The problem is
that it is not possible to identify with certainty all of the potential beneficiaries of reform.  For
example, some workers currently employed in import-competing industries may be able to make
a smooth transition to employment in export industries once trade is liberalized. Those workers
who do possess the skills to make this transition are likely to earn higher wages.  While it may be
possible to  argue that a  certain percentage of the labor force will make this  transition, it is
impossible to precisely identify the actual individuals who would benefit.  Therefore workers in
import-competing industries may rationally expect that there is some chance that they will be
better off under reform but there is also some chance that they will be worse off.  It  is not
difficult to imagine many situations where the downside risk for these workers outweighs the
upside potential.
Knowledge of the distribution of the private costs and benefits associated with trade
reform is relevant because such knowledge might guide the implementation of contemporaneous
policies that might diffuse some of the political opposition that may arise. One such policy is a
uniform tariff, long favored by the IMF and the World Bank as a means of diffusing political
support for protection. Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) have formalized the argument. They note
that a key advantage of a uniform tariff structure is that it will minimize lobbying by special5
interests for protection because it diffuses the benefits of protection. If the only way protection
can be increased is by increasing protection for all industries, lobbying for protection then yields
only dispersed benefits as well as costs. Then a uniform tariff creates a free-rider problem for the
interests seeking protection.
Knowledge of the distribution of private costs is also useful because of genuine concerns
for an equitable distribution of income.  On the other hand, the social costs and benefits are the
relevant measures to  use when  contemplating the aggregate welfare effect  of trade  reform.
Obviously, reforms  should not  be  undertaken if the  costs  outweigh the  benefits.  Even in
situations where the benefits of reform are a little larger than the costs, it may not be beneficial to
liberalize since policies designed to spread the burden of adjustment by redistributing income are
likely to be distortionary and entail a social cost of their own.  This is true whether these policies
are motivated by political expediency or by concerns for equity.  The probability of being able to
implement redistributive policies in a fashion that generates political support for reform and
minimizes the adverse impact on the distribution of income grows as the ratio of social benefits
to social costs increases.
Typically policy discussions focus on how to minimize the adjustment costs. But during a
period of unemployment, temporarily unemployed workers acquire information about their best
job prospects. As numerous "search" models have formalized, in any period each worker should
continue to  search for a job  rather than take an existing offer if his or her expectation of an
improved job  offer results in sufficiently increased lifetime earnings to compensate for the lost
income of being unemployed during that period. 3 Zero unemployment implies that vacancies are
immediately filled and that workers spend no time searching.  The lack of time spent searching
will result in lost lifetime earnings and workers choosing jobs where the value of their marginal6
product  is lower  than in alternate  positions.  A situation  of zero unemployment  or zero adjustment
costs  is not likely to be socially  optimal.
B.  Employment  and  Output Loss: A Micro-theoretic  Framework.
The  general  equilibrium  measurement  of the  short-run  output  loss  resulting  from  trade
liberalization  can  be  visualized  by  using  the  simple  diagrammatic  methods  that  are  generally
used  to demonstrate  the  general  equilibrium  benefits  of trade  liberalization. 4 Consider  a small
country  that  produces  exportables  and  importables.  Assume  that  all  consumers  have  the  same
preferences  so that  social welfare  can be represented  by  a single set of indifference  curves.  The
production  possibilities  curve  for this  economy  is shown  in Figure  1.  At  the  initial  (distorted)
equilibrium,  production  takes  place  at point  Sd,  consumption  at point  Cd.  Moving  to free trade
causes  the  economy  to  slide  up  along  its  production  possibilities  curve  to  point  SFT.
Consumption  now  occurs at  point CFT. The distance  B represents  the welfare  gain,  measured  in
terms  of exportables.  This  is the amount  of income  that  could  be taken  away  from  consumers
who  are  faced  with  free  trade  prices  and  still  leave  them  just  as well  off  as  they  were  in the
distorted  equilibrium.
To  measure  the  costs  of  adjustment,  Neary  (1982)  suggests  looking  at  the  difference
along the adjustment  path  between  the actual level of income  and the level  of income that would
be attained  once  all  adjustments  have  been  undertaken.  Consider  Figure  2, where  it is assumed
for simplicity  that  liberalization  first causes  all resources  that are released  from  the importables
sector to become  unemployed  during the first period after liberalization,  and then  fully employed
thereafter.  In this  case,  the adjustment  cost is measured  as distance  C1. It is possible  for Cl  to
exceed  B.  However,  the correct  comparison  is between  a benefit  stream  of B continuing  into the
infinite  future  and  a one time  adjustment  cost of Cl.  More  specifically,  the  discounted  benefits7
of liberalization exceed the discounted costs if and only if  ->  C,,  where r is the social rate of
r
discount.
The time profile of adjustment used in this example is extreme. Data on adjustment costs
indicate  that  adjustment  occurs  over  several periods  with  adjustment  costs  progressively
declining, i.e.,  C,, 1 < C,, where  C, is the adjustment cost during period t.  This follows since
resources  are  likely  to  be  gradually  re-employed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  benefits  of
liberalization do not decline and are likely to grow over time as the economy grows.  Letting B,
represent the  benefits  during period t,  the  discounted benefits  of trade  reforrn  exceed  the
m  B,  Cn
discounted adjustment costs if and only if  EE
Those who have attempted empirical measurement of the costs and benefits  of trade
liberalization have generally taken into account both discounting and the time-dependent nature
of the costs and benefits.
It is necessary to understand the dynamics of the labor market in order to gain deeper
insight into the short-run employment effects of trade reform.  Figure 3, which schematically
illustrates the various labor market flows, provides the basis for such understanding.
The labor market illustrated in Figure 3 is greatly simplified by assuming  that at any
point in time a worker can either be employed in the export sector, employed in the import-
competing sector, unemployed, or not in the labor force.  The arrows in Figure 3 represent flows
between sectors.  For example, the arrow pointing downward between the boxes labeled "Export
Sector" and "Unemployment" represents the flow of workers who are laid off from firms in the
export sector and become unemployed.  The corresponding arrow that points upward represents
the flow of workers who leave unemployment to take jobs in the export sector.8
Assuming no change in the size of the labor force, a  steady-state equilibrium will be
characterized by a situation where each flow between any two states (for example, the flow of
workers  from  the  export  sector  into  unemployment) is just  matched  by  a  flow  of  equal
magnitude, but in the opposite direction (a flow of workers out of unemployment into the export
sector). In this sort of equilibrium, the size of each sector remains unchanged, as does the size of
the workforce that is unemployed.
Trade reform results in an increased demand for workers by firms in the export sector
combined with a decrease in labor demand by workers in the import-competing sector.  It is
known (see Roberts and  Tybout, 1997) that there are fixed costs in entering  export markets
which create a kind of inertia since firms in the export sector may be slow to respond to trade
reforms until they are convinced they will stick, or until the incentives to export change by more
than a marginal amnount,  resulting in a slow response to trade reforms in the export sector. As the
import-competing sector  contracts,  the  arrows  originating  from  the  box  labeled  "Import-
Competing Sector" and pointing outward swell with workers who are laid off.  Some of these
workers may elect to retire, exiting the labor force entirely.  Others will become unemployed
while searching for new employment.  At the same time, all arrows pointing toward the box
labeled "Import-Competing Sector" shrink in size since few firms in this sector will be hiring. 5
This will have the temporary effect of swelling the number of unemployed workers and possibly
also the number of workers out  of the labor force.  This  temporary reduction  in  aggregate
employment (and the corresponding output loss) is the true social cost of adjustment. 6 Relating
this to the discussion underlying Figures I and 2, this cost can be measured by evaluating the
level of output that will be produced once the export sector expands to its steady-state size and9
all adjustments have been made and subtracting the value of output that is produced subsequent
to the liberalization but prior to the time when all adjustments have been made.
The size of adjustment costs is determined by the speed with which workers make the
transition from one state to another (for example, from unemployment to employment in the
import competing sector).  In principle, transition rates are functions of a variety of variables
such as the demographics of the population, the distribution of skills, the degree of governmental
support  for  unemployed  workers,  laws  restricting  involuntary  separations,  the  degree  of
unionization, the share of economic activity undertaken by state-owned enterprises, and so on.10
III.  Employment and Output Loss: The Evidence
A.  Trade Reform and Employment in Developing Countries
Unskilled labor is relatively abundant in developing countries.  In the context of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade reform can be expected to increase the overall demand for such
labor in the long run.  This follows since such countries have a comparative advantage in goods
that use unskilled labor intensively.  Removing policies that favor import-competing sectors at
the expense of (labor-intensive) export sectors ultimately results in an expansion of the latter and
contraction  of  the  former.  Any  increase  in  the  demand for  unskilled  labor  results  in  a
combination of higher wages and employment for this segment of the population. 7 8
There is little hard evidence relating trade reform to overall labor demand.  However
three  recent  studies  suggest  that  trade  reform  has  had  the  expected  positive  impact  on
employment in a variety of countries.  First, a retrospective study of trade reform in 19 countries
by  Papageorgiou, Choksi,  and  Michaely (1990)  concludes that  trade  liberalization  did  not
generally result in decreased employment even in the short run.  The evidence that they present
is reproduced here as  Table  1.  They report employment data prior  to liberalization, during
liberalization  and one  year after  liberalization. Compared with  the  pre-liberalization period,
manufacturing employment was larger one year subsequent to the completion of liberalization in
all  but  one  of  the twelve  countries for  which  data was  reported.  In  fact,  manufacturing
employment was higher in twelve of thirteen cases during the liberalization period compared
with the levels registered prior to liberalization.
Two caveats to the Papageorgiou, Choksi, Michaely data is that they only provide
information for manufacturing employment, and they do not measure underemployment. This
may mask changes in employment (either positive or negative) that may have occurred11
elsewhere in the economy or in underemployment. 9 On the other hand, policy makers are often
concerned about the possibility that liberalization  may lead to "deindustrialization." The
employment trends reported in Table 1 do not lend support to this hypothesis. Moreover, we note
that in the case of Chile, which is the one reported case where manufacturing employment fell,
employment in agriculture increased.
In a separate study, Parker et al. (1995) examined employment growth in micro and small
scale enterprises (MSE) subsequent to episodes of reform in Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and
Tanzania.'0 Their findings, reported in Table 2, indicate that annual employment growth among
existing MSEs was strong subsequent to reform implementation.  "  l Harrison and Revenga (1995)
studied sixteen countries that underwent significant liberalization in the past decade and a half.
They are able to track total employment growth for six of these countries. Their data is
reproduced in Table 3. Employment continued to grow throughout the period prior to, during,
and after reform in Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay. The same cannot be said for the transitional
economies of Eastern Europe. As Harrison and Revenga note, however, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Romania were undergoing significant reforms that went well beyond trade
liberalization, and the problem for many of the transition economies was devise policies to halt
the steep decline in output. In fact, the World Bank's World Development Report (1996) showed
that output losses have been the smallest for those countries where broad liberalization has been
the greatest.
Given the difficulty of controlling for all factors, the data in Tables 1 through 3 do not
suggest what the level of employment (or rate growth of employment, as in the case of Table 2)
would have been had there been no liberalization nor is it possible to infer from this data alone
what the level of output would have been immediately following liberalization compared with12
the  level of output obtained  subsequent to  all adjustments.  That  is,  it  is conceivable that
employment would have grown at an even faster pace had trade not been liberalized.  It is also
conceivable that employment would have stagnated in the absence of reforms. It is impossible to
say what might have been without properly controlling for other factors that may have impacted
employment. Since there is no reason to believe that the data are biased, however, the data are
consistent with the expectation that reform leads to greater employment in the long run.
B.  Formal Studies of Adjustment Costs
A number of researchers have attempted to measure explicitly the adjustment costs that
can be expected to  result from trade liberalization.  Virtually all of these  studies pertain to
developed countries, but they may provide some insight regarding the costs borne by developing
countries as well. On the one hand, formal labor markets in developing countries may be less
flexible than in industrial countries, suggesting adjustment costs would be higher. On the other
hand,  a  higher percentage  of  employment in  developing  countries is  in  agriculture and  in
informal labor markets which are very flexible-implying  lower adjustment costs. Thus, there is
no clear bias in extrapolating developed country results to developing countries. Moreover, work
by  Hoddinott  (1996) on  labor markets in  Cote d'Ivoire  finds  the  existence of  an inverse
relationship between wages and unemployment that is remarkably similar to relationships found
by Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) for a large sample of developed countries.  This similarity
suggests that labor markets in at least one developing country behave in roughly the same way as
labor markets in developed countries, and therefore studies of adjustment costs for developed
countries may have relevance for developing country experience.
In the first study of its kind, Magee (1972) considered the costs and benefits that one
could expect if the United States completely liberalized its trade with the rest of the world.  In13
conducting his study, Magee explicitly accounted for the fact that the benefits of liberalization
are permanent while the adjustment costs are temporary.  In computing adjustment costs, Magee
forecast the number of workers that would become unemployed due to the reductions in import
barriers and then multiplied by their average wage.  He adjusted for the expected duration of
unemployment and assumed that all adjustments would be completed within five years.  Using
alternative  discount  rates,  he  was  then  able  to  estimate  the  present  discounted  value  of
adjustrnent costs and compare them with the standard efficiency gains due to liberalization.  The
benefit-cost ratios calculated from Magee's work are reported in Table 4.
Based on the figures reported in Table 4, after only one year U.S. trade reform would
create 5.7 dollars worth of benefits measured in terms of efficiency gains for every dollar of
adjustment costs.  By the end of five years, trade reform would result in more than 8 dollars of
benefit for every dollar of adjustment cost.  Even when the future is heavily discounted, by the
end of the fifteenth year the reforms generate more than 19 dollars of benefit for every dollar of
adjustment cost.  The final line of Table 4 reports benefit-cost ratios where benefits are summed
up over the infinite future.
Magee's estimates are very rough and do not account for the costs of capital equipment
that may be idled as a result of reduced import barriers.  In an attempt to obtain more precise
measures of  adjustment costs that  included the costs  of idle  capital, Baldwin et  al.  (1980)
estimated the potential impact on the U.S. economy of a 50 percent multilateral tariff reduction.
While Magee aggregated all trade into a few small categories, Baldwin et al. studied 367 distinct
sectors.  Like Magee, Baldwin et al. estimated the changes in employment that would result from
the tariff reduction and valued this change in employment at an appropriate wage.  12 In addition,
Baldwin et al. assumed that every one percent contraction in industry output is accompanied by a14
one percent contraction in capital utilization. 13  They noted that if capital equipment in general
has a useful life of ten years, then one percent of the capital stock wears out every 1.2 months.
The authors of this study then went on to assume that any capital idled by trade reform would be
the oldest capital equipment.  Therefore, if one percent of the capital stock was idled by trade
reform, the maximum income loss would be equivalent to what that capital could have produced
in 1.2 months.
In  total,  the  authors  estimated that  every  dollar of  adjustment  costs brings  with  it
approximately 2.4 dollars of benefits in the form of efficiency gains after just one year.  Using a
ten percent discount rate and assuming that all adjustments are completed within one year of
policy implementation, they calculated that benefits outweigh costs by a  ratio of more than
twenty four to one.  The authors concluded that even though their study was imperfect, the
estimated benefits of liberalization are so much larger than the estimated adjustment costs that it
would be implausible for any reasonable variations on their analysis to yield opposite results.14
While Baldwin et al. found a very large ratio of benefits to costs, they also found that the
costs are concentrated among a few industries.  Specifically, industries with the largest declines
in employment include Food Utensils and Pottery (20.6%), Rubber Footwear (13.1%), Artificial
Flowers (11.3%), and Pottery Products (9.7%).  15  More generally, the authors calculated that a
50 percent multilateral tariff reduction would reduce employment by one percent or more in
fewer than ten percent of the industries studied.' 6
A number of authors have attempted to quantify the potential economy-wide employment
effects resulting from trade reform for countries other than the United States.  One such study by
Dixon  et  al.  explored  the  consequences of  a  25  percent  reduction  in  Australia's  level  of
protection.  In particular, the authors of this study asked how trade reform could be expected to15
alter the occupational makeup of the economy.  They explored several different scenarios and
conclude that a 25 percent liberalization might force anywhere from two percent to as much as
fourteen  percent  of  the  labor  force  to  change  occupations  within  two  years  after  the
implementation of the policy.'7 By way of comparison, the authors of this study estimated that
between 1961 and 1976, anywhere from 32 percent to  142 percent of the labor force changed
occupations during a given two year period.
Unlike Magee (1972) and  Baldwin, et al. (1980), the authors of this  study made no
attempt to  quantify the potential efficiency gains from liberalization, nor did they attempt to
quantify the value of lost output experienced when workers who are forced  to switch occupations
find themselves temporarily unemployed.  Rather they implied that the labor market disruption
associated with trade reform is no larger in magnitude than the disruptions that occur with the
natural ebb and flow of the economy.
De Melo and Roland-Holst (1994) carried out one  of the only studies  relating trade
reform to potential employment changes in a developing country.  This study of the Uruguayan
economy differs from the studies of the U.S. and Australian economies discussed above because
of  the  recognition that  much  of  the protection afforded domestic  industries in  developing
countries is in the form of administered protection.  This form of protection generates  strong
incentives for rent-seeking activities leading to welfare costs of protection that are larger than the
standard efficiency-losses.  Based on their analysis, the authors concluded that elimination of
tariffs and administered protection along with the elimination of all rent seeking activity would
likely result in the need for approximately five percent of the labor force to relocate.  Since the
authors did not estimate the time that relocating workers would spend unemployed nor did they
estimate the value of production that would be lost during this transition period, it is not possible16
to obtain a direct measure of adjustment costs to weigh against their measure of the benefits of
reform.  The difficulty of quantifying the costs of this labor shift is further compounded by the
fact that the authors failed to compare this figure with the normal amount of job turnover.
All  of the authors  of  the  studies mentioned to  this  point attempted to  quantify the
adjustments resulting from economy-wide trade reform. By contrast, a few authors have focused
their attention on individual industries. For example, de Melo and Tarr (1990) investigated the
efficiency gains and employment adjustments that would follow from a removal of quantitative
restrictions on U.S.  imports of textiles, steel, and automobiles.19 According to their analysis,
these reforms would generate the need for fewer than one quarter of one percent of the labor
force to relocate. To measure the costs borne by the relocating workers, the authors of this study
used  evidence from  Jacobson  (1978) to  argue that these workers experience  some  loss of
earnings for approximately six years after displacement. They used this information to calculate
the ratio of the present discounted value of the benefits of liberalization to the costs of worker
displacement.  They  estimated  that  gains  to  the  U.S.  economy  from  liberalization  are
approximately 28 dollars for every dollar of cost. 20
In a series of nine partial equilibrium case studies, Morkre and Tarr (1980) and Tarr and
Morkre (1984) examined many of the important cases of U.S. protection applied to  specific
industries. In general, these studies found that the benefits of trade liberalization vastly exceeded
the adjustment costs. For example, Morkre and Tarr (1980) estimated the benefits and costs of
removal of the sugar quotas, footwear quotas and tariffs on textile and apparel products by the
U.S. They estimated that removal of sugar quotas by the U.S. would result in about 16 dollars of
benefits for every dollar of unemployment costs. Liberalization of footwear quotas, and textiles
and apparel tariffs would produce benefit-cost ratios of about 68 and 57, respectively. Tarr and17
Morkre (1984) estimated that, depending on elasticities, the removal of quotas in textiles and
apparel would result in between 7 and 19 dollars of benefits for every dollar of unemployment
costs.
Takacs and Winters (1991) carefully studied the British footwear industry with the intent
of projecting the effects of eliminating quantitative restrictions on imports. They made use of the
fact that there exists a natural turnover of employment within the industry. The authors assume
that those workers who are displaced by trade liberalization become re-employed in the shoe
industry when other workers voluntarily leave employment. For example, almost 17 percent of
the employees at two large shoe manufacturers voluntarily left employment each year between
1984 and 1986. If workers displaced due to trade liberalization are the first claimants on new job
openings, then the authors estimated that workers displaced due to trade liberalization would
become re-employed within seven weeks. 21 The authors went  on to  calculate the  standard
efficiency gain from  liberalization for purposes of comparing this gain with the value of lost
employment,  where  the  value  of  lost  employment  was  calculated  at  the  workers'  pre-
unemployment wage. 22 Doing so, they calculated a benefit-cost ratio of 153 after just one year. 23
Even if the natural turnover rate is as low as eight percent, the adjustment period is only  14
weeks and abolition of quantitative restrictions can still can still be expected to generate more
than eighty dollars of benefit for every dollar of cost after just one year. 24
Using data  on industry-specific durations of unemployment reported by  Bale (1973),
Mutti (1978) compared the  benefits of trade  liberalization for five U.S.  industries with  the
adjustment costs.  In order of increasing benefit-cost ratios (which are indicated in parentheses),
the industries studied are Iron and Steel (1.3), Machine Tools (2.8), Industrial Chemicals (5.2),
Motor Vehicles (5.2),  and Electrical Machinery (24.4). In calculating these figures, Mutti used a18
discount rate of ten percent and accounted for the persistence and growth of benefits over time. 25
By comparison with the studies mentioned earlier, these benefit-cost ratios are quite small.  This
can be  attributed to the rather lengthy durations of unemployment that Mutti assumed in his
analysis.
In summary, a variety of industry and country studies have been undertaken to try to
quantify the magnitude of the adjustments that could be expected to accompany trade reform. In
virtually every instance the estimated degree of adjustment is relatively small compared with the
natural dynamics of the labor force. In studies where such comparisons are possible, it seems to
be the  case that each dollar  of  adjustment cost  is  associated with  several dollars worth of
efficiency gains.  It is worth bearing in mind that adjustment costs are the largest in the period
immediately after the implementation of reforms, disappearing after a period of one to five years.
By contrast, the efficiency gains of liberalization grow over time and continue indefinitely.
C.  Labor Market Dynamics in Developing Countries
The costs of adjusting to trade reform are clearly minimized when labor and  capital
markets are highly flexible so that the transition probabilities out of unemployment are relatively
high.  Most  of the  studies  described thus  far  have explicitly  accounted for  the  speed  of
adjustment  by  incorporating  data  on  unemployment  duration  or  rates  of  job  turnover.
Unfortunately, these measures are not typically available for most developing countries.  The
evidence that  is available  seems  to  indicate  a  wide variety  of  country-specific rates.  For
example, Haltiwanger and Singh (1996) reported on the labor market experiences of 60,000 civil
service workers who were retrenched by the Government of Ghana between 1987 and 1992. A
survey of these workers revealed that 10 percent had quit the labor force with 97 percent of the
remaining  workers finding  new  employment within two  years. 26 At  the  other  end  of  the19
spectrum, the average duration of unemployment was 50 months  for the 1.7 million workers
(nearly 9 percent of the labor force) dismissed from Hungarian state enterprises between  1990
and 1992.27
In the absence of readily available data on labor markets, it may be possible to obtain
some sense of the speed with which adjustment can take place in developing countries by again
looking at the dynamic role played by micro and small-scale enterprises. According to Liedholm
and  Meade  (1995), MSEs  account  for  a  significant portion  of  employment in  developing
countries.  While the majority of such enterprises consist of a single employee or are family
owned and operated, MSEs hire a significant number of paid employees.  Some characteristics of
these enterprises are reproduced in Table 5.
According to Liedholm and Meade, MSEs are highly dynamic.  In particular, they report
that the annual rate at which new MSEs were created in the  sample of countries that  they
examined was generally in excess of twenty percent.  This is a substantially higher start-up rate
than found in industrialized countries.2 8 Their data is reproduced in Table 6.  The very high
start-up  rates  suggest  that  entrepreneurs  in  these  countries  are  quick to  respond  to  new
opportunities, making speedy adjustment to trade reform quite likely.  Looked at another way,
the magnitude of dislocation caused by liberalization is unlikely to be significantly larger than
dislocations associated with the everyday workings of the economy.
D.  Private Adjustment Costs
As mentioned earlier, research seems to  suggest that  significant trade liberalization  is
likely to result in a relatively small dislocation of workers and a correspondingly small cost for
society. The private cost borne by a dislocated worker, however, may be a significant fraction of
his lifetime earnings. Available research tends to show that the private losses borne by individual20
workers depend heavily on worker characteristics. On the one hand there are workers who have
substantial specific human  capital accumulated in the industry or  firm, or  workers who are
earning substantial wage premia (possibly due to union power or high government wage scales
or efficiency wages). These workers tend to lose a lot as a result of displacement. On the other
hand, workers with little specific human capital or who are not earning wage premia lose little or
nothing from displacement, depending on the industry.
For example, Jacobson, et al. (1993a, 1993b) studied a sample of American workers who
were displaced from their jobs between 1980 and 1986.29 They found that even as long as five
years after the dislocation, workers who had long job  tenure with their previous employers were
earning on average twenty five percent less than they earned in 1979.3° In a similar study, Rama
and MacIsaac (1996) found that after  15 months, employees displaced from their jobs  at the
Ecuadorian Central Bank  (BCE) in 1994 were on average earning only 55 percent of their pre-
displacement income.  Rama and MacIsaac argued that the earnings loss is unlikely to shrink to
the 25 percent figure reported by Jacobsen et al. because there was no indication in the data of
any recovery of income even after 15 months despite a low overall  unemployment rate.  In
addition, they assert that  pay at the BCE was out of line with salaries in the private sector,
making it difficult for displaced employees to find similar salaries in the private sector.  In a
separate study, Tansel (1996) found that Turkish workers laid off from privatized cement firms
experienced earnings losses of 61 percent.  Earnings losses for workers laid off from the state-
owned petrochemicals firm amounted to 57 percent.
By contrast, Jacobsen  (1978) found that two years after displacement workers in  low
wage  industries  actually  earned  more  income than  their  non-displaced  counterparts  in  the
original  industry. Moreover,  he found that six years after displacement, earnings losses had21
vanished for all industries, not just for low wage industries. The difference in the results between
the Jacobsen studies is explained by the fact that the 1993 studies restrict the sample to workers
with long job tenure and who are therefore likely to have accumulated specific human capital or
earn wage premia. His 1978, study, however, is a broad sample of short, medium and long tenure
workers who have on average much less specific human capital. Similarly, Orazem, Vodopivec,
and Wu (1995) found that more than two thirds of displaced Slovenian workers who found new
jobs actually earned wages higher than their predisplacement wages.  31  Mills and Sahn (1995)
found that of the public-sector workers retrenched in Guinea who were able to find new jobs,
more than half had increased earnings. However, the average duration of unemployment for this
group was approximately two and one half years, 32 and thirty percent of public-sector workers
who were retrenched between 1985 and 1988 were still unemployed as of 1992.
It  is  important to  recognize that the private  costs borne  by dislocated  workers  and
entrepreneurs need not coincide, even in the aggregate, with the social costs identified earlier in
this paper.  For example, some workers may enjoy a high wage due to distortions in the labor
market.  These distortions may include the presence of excessive union power or the existence of
inflexible government wage scales.  In such instances, there is a substantial private cost but no
social cost  (except perhaps  that  associated with  a  transitional period of  unemployment)  as
competitive pressures from  trade  reform force a  reduction  in  the  size of  distorted  sectors.
Similarly, liberalization  of the  trading regime  might  induce  changes in  the  values  that  an
economy places on various forms of human capital.  Workers who have accumulated significant
amounts of firm-specific or sector-specific human capital may suffer a substantial (private) loss
as the demand for their skills declines.33  In any event, this is no more a social cost than is the
change in any price that is induced by changing market conditions.22
E. Retraining Programs to Reduce Adjustment Costs
Programs designed to retrain workers to make them more employable generate additional
social costs to the extent that they require the use of resources that could have been used in other
productive  activities.  However, such  programs may  reduce  the  social (and  private)  costs
associated with adjustment if they have the desired effect of shortening spells of unemployment.
A recent  study of retraining programs in Hungary found that workers who participated had a
slightly higher chance of becoming re-employed compared with those who did not participate. 34
Furthermore, the wages of participants upon re-employment were slightly higher compared with
those  of non-participants who became re-employed.  Perhaps the biggest difference between
participants and non-participants was that the former obtained jobs that had longer durations than
the latter, indicating the potential for the retraining program to have a significantly positive effect
on lifetime income of participants.  However, it is not clear that the benefits of the program were
sufficient to justify the costs.
Another program that provides government sponsored training can be found in Mexico.
The PROBECAT program provides  short-term skills  training  to  unemployed workers.  An
evaluation of this program found that it was effective in reducing the duration of unemployment
for participants who had prior work experience and it helped raise the earnings of adult males
who participated. The program, however, had no effect on the fate of trainees with no prior work
experience or women who were reentering the work force. 35
The United States has been providing trade adjustment assistance (TAA) to  workers
displaced  by  international  trade  since  1962.  The  US  program  provides  both  monetary
compensation (called Trade Readjustment Allowances, TRA) and retraining. In the early years of23
the program, it was found that income support was typically provided to workers who were not
permanently separated from their employers, i.e., the program was not well targeted (Corson and
Nicholson, 1981). However, changes in the design and monitoring of the program in 1982 and
1988 have resulted in targeting the payments to the intended recipients. U.S. recipients of TAA
now are typically  permanently  separated from  their  employer  and  also  experience  greater
difficulty in gaining reemployment than do typical recipients of unemployment compensation
(Decker and  Corson,  1995). Following the  changes of  1988, participation in  an  approved
retraining program is a requirement to receive monetary compensation (TRA), unless a waiver is
obtained. Evaluation of the experience of trade displaced workers reveals that participation in
retraining programs did not have a positive impact on the earnings of trainees, at least in the first
three years after the initial claim for unemployment compensation (Decker and Corson, 1995).
Thus, the results of retraining programs appear to be mixed. When retraining is required,
as in the U.S., it may be ineffective. More generally, the effectiveness of retraining programs
tends to increase if they are demand driven, so, for example, subsidized apprenticeships in the
private  sector may  work better than  government provided training  programs. 36 An alternate
approach to requiring retraining is to require the participation in  a job  search program. This
appears to increase the likelihood of employment and reduce unemployment benefits  among
recipients (Johnson and Klepinger, 1991; Decker and Corson, 1995).
F.  Impact on Poverty
What is the impact of trade liberalization on poverty? First, experience suggests that rapid
economic growth  translates  into  sustainable reductions  in  poverty.  Evidence  also  shows  a
significant association between trade  liberalization and long-run  improvements in  economic
growth. Thus, there  is likely to be  a  positive link between liberalization and  eradication  of24
poverty in the long run. Second, since trade reform reduces the anti-export bias and to the extent
that exports are intensive in the use of unskilled or rural labor (which may be expected but not
guaranteed in developing countries), trade reform is expected to  increase the real wage and
reduce both poverty and inequality.
Third, the circumstances and causes of poverty vary greatly. The major resource of the
poor is their own labor. Trade liberalization affects a poor family in two ways. First, it affects the
wages they earn and (if there are labor-market imperfections) whether they remain employed. If
they are farmers, it affects the income they earn from the sales of products. Second, it affects the
prices of the goods and services they consume. If trade liberalization raises staple food prices,
producers, (often poor  farmers) will gain, while subsistence farmers will be  unaffected and
consumers (often the urban poor) will suffer. For example, in Peru, poor farmers produce little
sorghum but much coffee. As a first pass, then, the liberalization of coffee trade will raise coffee
prices (and relieve poverty) while action on sorghum prices will not. A converse case is maize
farmers in Mexico, who will probably be harmed as NAFTA drives down prices. (See Levy and
Wijnbergen, 1992.)
Unfortunately there are very few empirical studies of the impact of trade liberalization on
the poor. One study of Mauritius, however, found evidence of such a trend. Trade and macro
stabilization  reforms  during  1980s  led  to  increased  income  and  a  sharp  reduction  of
unemployment, poverty and inequality. (See English, 1997).3
One excellent and  instructive study was based  on a  nationally representative Living
Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) of Panama (World Bank, forthcoming). Panama has a
distribution of income that is among the most unequal in the world: it has a Gini consumption
(income) coefficient of 49 (60); 37% of the population lives in poverty and 19% live in extreme25
poverty. Wage income represents 77% of the income of the poor, but unemployment (20% in
1989) and underemployment were very high. Moreover, close to three-fourths of the poor work
in the informal sector, where workers earn 60% and 43% of what workers in the private and
public formal sectors earn.
Prior to the 1990s, Panama was one of the most protected economies in Latin America.
Combined with price  controls and rigid labor market rules  (that  prevented termination  and
imposed minimum wages), this resulted in a highly inefficient manufacturing and agricultural
sector that stifled growth and generated rents for certain groups (including workers who obtained
jobs in the formal sector). But the protection raised prices of the basic consumption basket and
depressed wages of workers in the informal sector where three-quarters of the poor work, i.e., it
was highly regressive, implicitly taxing the poor and increasing poverty. In late 1996 and 1997
the government introduced widespread trade reform to accompany previously implemented labor
market reform, competition law  reform and privatization that had  begun  in  1994.  Growth
jumped in 1997 and, crucially for the poor, unemployment fell to 13.2% from 16.2% in 1994.
Since agriculture  represents 59% of the  consumption expenditures  and  41%  of  the
income source of poor Panamanians, the study also went beyond an assessment of the empirical
data and employed a model to simulate the complete elimination of agricultural protection. The
authors estimate that this further trade liberalization would reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.6
percentage points, the poverty rate would fall by  1.7 percentage points, and extreme poverty
would fall by 1.1 percentage points. Despite the reduction in the cost of the consumption basket
for the average poor person, some farmers would lose. Net  losers would represent only two
percent of the population, of whom one third are poor. They suggest programs for targeting the
minority of poor farmers who would be adversely impacted.26
Trade liberalization is likely to be associated with reduced poverty in the long run. For
the short to medium run, trade liberalization will reduce the cost of the consumption basket of
the poor which, by itself will have an impact on the reduction of poverty. The two studies cited
also found a positive impact of trade liberalization on wages or employment of the poor since the
poor tended to be located in unprotected sectors. But even when there is a general reduction in
poverty, we must recognize that some of the poor may be made worse off. Some poor farmers,
for example, may be made worse off by agriculture reform, especially in the short to medium run
when adjustment costs remain.27
IV.  Trade Reform and Macroeconomic Stability
A broad  definition of adjustment costs would include the possible short-term loss of
government revenue, balance of payments difficulties, and macroeconomic instability resulting
from reform.  These are particularly important concerns for developing countries since many
tend to  rely heavily on trade taxes as a source of government revenue.  Data from the  1988
World Development Report reveal that in 1985 explicit trade taxes accounted for 38 percent of
total tax revenues in low-income developing countries and 19 percent  of total tax revenues in
middle-income  developing  countries. In  1990, collected trade  taxes  as  a  percent  of  GDP
averaged 0.6 percent among OECD countries and 4.4 percent among non-OECD countries. 38
Policy makers in low-income countries are concerned that one of the costs of trade reform might
be  a  substantial decline in  government revenue, yielding larger  fiscal deficits and  inducing
inflation.
While these concerns have some merit, trade reform need not entail diminished revenues.
A number of countries have implemented successful trade reform programs without significant
loss  of  revenue.  For  example,  in  the  1990s,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Senegal  and  Malawi  have
implemented trade reforms without a significant loss in revenue as a percent of GDP (Ebrill et
al., forthcoming).
Perhaps the foremost reason why trade reform need not lead to a loss of revenue is that
developing countries have traditionally relied heavily on quantitative restrictions  of imports.
Government revenue actually increases when quantitative restrictions are converted into their
tariff equivalents. If tariff rates are very high initially, they will generate little or no revenue;
reductions of the tariffs to more moderate levels will increase the quantity of imports, and the
increased quantity effect will increase revenues. One way this  will occur is that by reducing28
extremely high tariff  rates, the incentive to smuggle is reduced, thus increasing the share of
official transactions in  imports. Low tariffs may be  placed on previously exempted goods,
thereby increasing revenue.  Finally, an exchange rate depreciation, which should accompany
tariff reduction, will also provide additional tariff revenue to partially offset reduced tariff rates.
When tariffs rates are already uniform and in the moderate to  low range, then further tariff
reduction is much more likely to result in revenue loss. 3 9
One  World Bank  study  of  9  countries that  undertook 35  trade-oriented  adjustment
programs during the 1980's examined the impact of adjustment on tariff revenues.  Of these nine
countries, Cote d'Ivoire,  Ghana, Jamaica, Pakistan, and Turkey actually increased their ratio of
trade taxes relative to GDP while Indonesia, Mexico, and Morocco experienced a decline in this
measure.40  Columbia's  foreign trade taxes were 2.3  percent of  GDP both  before and after
implementation of reforms.  As a group, trade taxes as a percent of GDP increased from 3.6
percent prior to reform to 4.5 percent subsequent to reform.
In a  separate study,  Thomas and Nash (1991) examined import tax revenues for  15
countries that underwent moderate to substantial trade reforms during the period 1980-87.  For
Bangladesh,  Colombia, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mauritius, and  Pakistan, trade reform
consisted primarily of  a  switch from quantitative restrictions to tariff  restrictions along with
reductions in the number of duty exemptions.  These countries were labeled quota reformers.
The remaining eight countries pursued reductions in tariff rates more aggressively and were
therefore called tariff reformers.  Tariff reformers included Chile, Korea, Mexico, Morocco,
Panama, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey.  Figure 4 illustrates that import tax revenues
measured as a percentage of GDP declined for tariff reformers but increased for quota reformers.29
Evidence of the effects of reform on inflation, the fiscal balance, and trade balance is
quite  encouraging.  Thomas and Nash (1991) classified a  group  of 24 reforming  countries
according to  whether the  implemented reforms were  substantial, moderate, or  mild. 41 The
substantial reformers included Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Jamaica, Korea, Mauritius, Mexico, and
Turkey.  The moderate reforrners were Bangladesh, Madagascar, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama,
the Philippines,  and Thailand. The mild reformers included  Cote d'Ivoire,  Guyana,  Kenya,
Malawi, Senegal, Togo, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  Table 7 shows that the substantial
and  moderate  reformers were  generally able  to  reduce inflation,  fiscal  deficits,  and  trade
deficits.42 By contrast, the mild reformers had somewhat larger fiscal deficits and somewhat
higher inflation after reforms were implemented. However, the trade deficits for this group did
shrink after reform.
In general the data support the theory that removal of quantitative restraints  typically
leads to an increase in revenue and that trade reform does not typically lead to macroeconomic
instability. In economies where protection is already low, further tariff reforn  can be expected to
lower  government  revenue.  In  these  cases,  it  is  important to  develop taxes  that  do  not
discriminate against imports in order to reap the benefits of trade liberalization.
V.  Directions for Future Research
Existing research  gives  us  reason to  be  cautiously optimistic that  a  wide  range  of
economies are quite resilient and can adjust to trade liberalization swiftly and at minimal cost.
However, although  there  have been  many studies  of the  impact of  trade  liberalization  on
manufacturing employment in both developing and developed countries, attempts to quantify
adjustment costs have been confined, for the most part, to industrial economies in general, and30
the United States in particular.  On the one hand, formal labor markets in developing countries
may be less flexible than in industrial countries, suggesting adjustment costs would be higher.
On the other hand, a higher percentage of employment in developing countries is in agriculture
and  in  informal labor  markets  which  are very  flexible-implying  lower  adjustment costs.
Although data limitations may make the task difficult, it would be extremely useful to try to
rigorously measure adjustment costs for a range of developing countries. As we elaborate below,
however, there are households living at the subsistence level in some developing countries who
can  ill  afford  an  extended  period  of  unemployment. Knowledge  of  the  impacts  on  these
households could allow for appropriate provisions for them during adjustment. Such research
should be careful to model, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between transition
rates between states (as illustrated by the flows in Figure 3) and the institutional features, such as
a large number of state-owned enterprises, that are prominent in many developing countries.
Additional  research  should focus  on  identifying barriers  that  slow  down  resource
reallocation, thus creating excessive adjustment costs.  For example, it is typically argued that
legal restrictions that  limit the ability of  firms to  layoff employees can result  in  generally
inflexible labor markets.  Similarly, overly generous unemployment benefits may reduce the
incentives for newly laid-off workers to search for employment and therefore extend the time
required for adjustment.  Such policies may have beneficial aspects (for example, in providing a
social safety net) but may in  fact be welfare reducing when their  effects on adjustment are
considered.  Both theoretical and empirical work could shed light on the proper balance between
policies designed to be a social safety net and those designed to speed adjustment. (See the paper
by Schultz in this volume.)31
The research to date on adjustment costs has, for the most  part, not  incorporated the
heterogeneity of labor and households.  It would be very useful to have studies of the impact of
trade liberalization on the poorest households and on workers of different skill levels or incomes.
The  evidence indicates that  economic growth reduces poverty  and  that trade  liberalization
increases economic growth, so that trade liberalization should reduce poverty in the long run. But
given our earlier discussion about the diversity nature of the poor, an adjustment process could
conceivably adversely impact some of their poorest households.  It would appear necessary to
provision for the neediest in these situations, and further research could improve identification.
In addition, both economic theory and the evidence cited above from the studies by Jacobsen and
his co-authors suggest that earnings losses of workers depend on their characteristics such as
specific human capital and wage premia due to union power or efficiency wages. It would be
useful, however, to pre-select the sample of workers by their characteristics to determine more
clearly the impact of these phenomena on the social and private costs of adjustment.
Additional  research  should  be  undertaken  to  examine  the  most  effective  means  of
distributing the burden of adjustment more evenly across society and for reducing the costs of
adjustment  where  they  appear  to  be  excessive.  For  example,  providing  unemployment
compensation or other adjustment assistance to those who become unemployed due  to  trade
reforms  reduces the private  costs borne by those  individuals. But this  is  unlikely  to  be  an
optimally designed compensation scheme for a variety of reasons. First, workers are displaced
for  a  variety  of  reasons in  a  market  economy, and  it  is difficult to  rationalize  adjustment
assistance for trade displaced workers and not for other reasons, for example, for technology
displaced workers. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish workers who are displaced due to trade
liberalization from those who are displaced for other reasons. If programs are available only for32
trade displaced workers, displaced workers will claim they were  displaced for trade related
reasons.  Second, generally the workers who suffer the largest adjustment costs are the ones who
were earning substantial rents in their original job due to protection. In effect, they had received
indirect transfers from  workers in  unprotected industries. Thus,  it is  difficult to  rationalize
transfers that would compensate for all earnings losses since this implies continuing transfers
from workers in unprotected industries, workers who in some cases may be less wealthy. Third,
the incentive effects of compensation schemes on extending the duration of unemployment must
be taken into account. 43
Finally, additional research that would allow us to better identify the types of retraining
programs that are most cost-effective in reducing adjustment costs would be also useful.33
VI.  Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have summarized  the empirical research on the adjustment costs of trade
liberalization. We began with three studies that empirically examined employment effects from
thirty separate economy-wide episodes of trade liberalization in developing countries. In these
studies it is difficult to disentangle the effects of trade liberalization from other events occurring
simultaneously, but  generally, manufacturing employment increased  subsequent to  the tradc
liberalization.  Transition  economies  are  a  special  case  where  manufacturing  employment
declined after liberalization, but employment decline was faster in transition economies that did
not  liberalize. We  next  surveyed  studies that  quantify the costs  of  adjustment from  trade
liberalization. These include economy-wide studies of Australia and Uruguay and two of the
U.S., as well as studies by several authors of trade liberalization in 22 industries in the U.S. and
the U.K. In general, these studies find that the benefits of trade liberalization are vastly greater
than the costs--typically for each dollar of adjustment costs there  are typically more than 20
dollars of benefits from trade liberalization.
We next report on two studies of small and medium size enterprises in  eight African
economies. It  is found that  small and medium size enterprises in these countries are highly
dynamic (even when compared to industrialized countries), making speedy adjustment to trade
reform more likely.  Then we next examine studies of the private costs of adjustment in eight
countries.  These costs  can  be  quite  substantial  in  cases  where  the  workers  were  earning
substantial rents in their original job, but tend to be small otherwise.
In the last empirical section, we discuss the impact of trade reform on macro-economic
stability drawing on two studies that examined the impact on the fiscal deficit in  15 and  9
countries,  respectively. These  studies conclude that  countries that  were  eliminating  quotas34
typically reduced their fiscal deficits and inflation, while those reducing tariffs had slightly larger
fiscal deficits and inflation initially, that eventually shrank.
We find that it is necessary to apply caveats to most of the studies we survey regarding
conclusions with respect  to  adjustment costs; thus, it  is necessary to  be cautious regarding
conclusions based on any few of them. Most notably, while there are numerous studies on the
effects of trade liberalization on  aggregate employment in developing countries, virtually all
studies that quantified adjustment costs have been done in industrialized countries. Collectively,
however, the weight of so many studies of various types, all pointing in more or less the same
direction, makes it difficult to  avoid the conclusion that adjustment costs are very  small in
relation to the benefits of trade liberalization.
Why then do these studies find that adjustment costs are so small and that there is little
decline (usually an increase) in manufacturing employment in developing countries one year
after trade liberalization? Regarding manufacturing employment, these results are explained by a
number of considerations: (1) developing countries would be  expected to  have comparative
advantage in labor intensive industries, so trade liberalization should favor labor; (2) it has been
observed  that  a great  deal  of  inter-industry shifts occurred after trade  liberalization, which
minimized the dislocation of factors of production; and (3) in many industries normal labor
turnover exceeds dislocation from trade liberalization, so that downsizing where necessary could
be accomplished without much forced unemployment.
The explanation for the low adjustment costs in relation to the benefits is as follows: (t)
most importantly, adjustment costs are typically short term and terminate when workers find a
job, while the benefits of trade reform can be expected to grow with the economy; (2) estimates
of the duration of unemployment for most industries are not high, especially where workers were35
not earning substantial rents in the original job; and (3) as noted above, normal labor turnover
often exceeds job displacement from trade liberalization.
Given these results we devote some attention in this paper to an assessment of the private
costs of trade liberalization. Knowledge of the distribution of the private costs  and benefits
associated with  trade  reform is useful  because of concerns for  an  equitable distribution  of
income, and because  such knowledge might  guide the  implementation of  contemporaneous.
policies that might diffuse some of the political opposition that may arise.
One policy we recommended is a uniform tariff, a uniform tariff will minimize lobbying
by special interests for protection because it diffuses the benefits of protection. If the only way
protection can be increased is by increasing protection for all industries, lobbying for protection
then yields only dispersed benefits as well as costs to the lobbyists.
Finally we briefly discuss policies to minimize adjustment costs where it appears that
adjustment costs might be excessive, and suggest areas where additional research in this area
would be  useful.  We note that zero adjustment costs are socially  suboptimal in  a  dynamic
economy, since it would imply insufficient search time by temporarily unemployed workers.
Moreover,  given  sound  complementary  policies,  adjustment  costs  associated  with  trade
liberalization are unlikely to provide an adequate reason for delays in opening up to the outside
world. Nonetheless, it  is likely  that policymakers can  reduce such  costs. Perhaps  the most
important complementary policies are ensuring macroeconomic stability and the credibility of
policies so as to  foster a  quick, sustained private investment response in newly  competitive
sectors of the economy. Structural policy reforms to improve labor market flexibility and reformn
of the state enterprise sector may provide important complementary support. Of course, each of
these policies  is  likely to  be  of great. economic value  on its  own. The mutually  supportive36
relations  between trade, macroeconomic, labor market and  other policies may then serve to
increase the credibility and payoffs to each.
1.  Thomas and Nash (1991) summarize a number of studies that indicate the direct (efficiency) gains from
trade reform range from I  or 2 percent of GDP per year up to as much as 10 percent of GDP per year if
production is characterized by increasing returns to scale.  By eliminating incentives to smuggle, lobby,
evading tariffs and so on, trade reform can generate an additional (indirect) benefit.  Thomas and Nash
(1991) cite evidence that this indirect benefit may be larger than 6 percent of GDP in countries such as India
and Turkey.  In addition, there is some evidence that trade liberalization may improve long-run growth rates
by improving incentives to invest and save and by exposing the economy to more advanced technologies.
See Thomas and Nash (1991) for a brief survey of empirical evidence linking trade reforms to growth.
2.  We describe private adjustment costs more fully in section 3.D of this paper where we show that such costs
can be  quite large.  We also explain in that section that private costs, even in the aggregate, need not
coincide with the social costs identified in this paper.
3.  See Morgan and Manning (1985).
4.  The diagrammatic treatment in this section is based on Neary (1982).
5.  There  will still  be  some  hiring due  to the  fact that there  exists natural  attrition (retirements, workers
voluntarily quitting to relocate geographically or to take a better job).
6.  Surprisingly, there is little agreement among economists  regarding the determinants of the steady-state level
of  unemployment.  Most models of  international trade assume  no  unemployment in  the  steady state.
Theoretical studies that explicitly allow for the existence of long-run unemployment have concluded that
trade  liberalization can either reduce (Matusz 1996) or increase (Matusz 1994) the steady-state level of
unemployment. In any event, it is not the mere existence of unemployment that poses the adjustmnent  cost;
rather it is the change in unemployment that matters.
7.  Factor market distortions could conceivably invalidate the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of
trade.  For example, government subsidies to capital combined with legislation that artificially inflates the
cost of hiring workers could reduce relative production costs for capital-intensive industries compared with
labor-intensive industries.  In turn, this shift in relative production costs could reverse the pattern of trade
predicated on the basis of factor endowments and an expansion of the export sector could actually reduce
employment.  This possibility was recognized in Krueger (1983).  However, her review of ten case studies
(covering Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, and
Uruguay) indicates substantial scope for employment growth resulting from a switch toward export-oriented
policies even when factor markets are characterized by substantial distortions.
8.  The empirical relevance of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade has been questioned for more than 40 years,
ever since Leontief s celebrated finding that U.S. exports were labor-intensive relative to its imports. Recent
research has shown, see, for example, Trefler (1995), that a narrowly defined version of the model is a poor
reflection of reality. On the other hand, when the assumption of identical technologies across countries is
dropped and a home bias in consumption is allowed, the model does remarkably well in predicting things
such  as  relative wages  and  the  allocation of  resources across sectors. It  is these  latter more resilient
implications that we focus on in this paper.
9.  On the other hand, policy makers are often concerned about the possibility that liberalization may lead to
"deindustrialization."  The employment trends reported in Table I  do not lend support to this hypothesis.
Moreover,  we  note  that  in  the  case  of  Chile, which  is the  one  reported  case  where  manufacturing
employment fell, employment in agriculture increased.
10.  The authors of this study define micro enterprises as those comprised of 5 or fewer workers, whereas small
scale enterprises consist of 6 to 49 workers.
11.  The reforms undertaken  by these countries went  beyond  trade liberalization to  include regulatory and
financial reformns,  as well as reforms in public enterprises and the tax structure.  According to Parker, et al.,
the reforms were the most extensive and thorough in Ghana, followed closely by Mali.  They ranked Malawi
third in terms of the extensiveness of reforms, with Tanzania and Senegal having the least extensive reforms.37
12.  While Magee used an average wage rate for all workers, Baldwin et al. assumed that the wage rate of a
dislocated worker in a given industry was related to the demographic characteristics of the average worker in
that industry.  For example, if workers in one industry have more education on average than  workers in
another, then it would be logical to assume that the wage paid to the average worker in the former is higher
than that in the latter.
13.  To date, no other studies have attempted to quantify the costs of capital idled by trade reform.
14.  Since  Baldwin et. al. were concerned with evaluating the  impact of  the Tokyo Round, they  assume  a
multilateral tariff reduction. This poses some difficulties, however, in applying their results to the effects of
a unilateral tariff reduction, which is the more common question of interest to many policy makers.  Another
problem is that they assume that expansion of  the export sectors leads to a reduction in the duration of
unemployment.  While this may be true, it is also possible that such an  assumption understates the true
adjustment costs since export sectors may not expand as fast as import sectors contract.
15.  These are generally very labor intensive industries where comparative advantage would presumably lie witf
the developing countries.  Presumably, liberalization in labor abundant countries could lead to concentrated
employment reductions in relatively capital intensive industries.
16.  More recently, Cooper (1994) observes that U.S. employment in the  textile, apparel, and  leather  sectors
declined by  approximately 20 percent  between  1980 and  1990.  Similar declines  occurred  in France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  Cooper conjectures that these shifts were
due to increased competition from developing countries.  Even if true, this decline in employment amounts
to roughly two percent per year in these industries, a magnitude that is dwarfed by annual turnover due to
retirements and other voluntary quits.
17.  Their four scenarios are a 25 percent across the board cut in protection; a reduction in the highest tariff rates
to 31.17 percent; exempting textiles, footwear, and motor vehicles while cutting all other rates of protection
by 75.85 percent; and exempting these sectors while cutting the remaining highest tariffs to 3.17 percent.
18.  For the situation of complete trade reform, including elimination of rent-seeking activities, the authors
estimate that the welfare gain for Uruguay would be equivalent to more than eight percent of GDP.
19.  While the focus of this study is on the removal of trade barriers in these three industries, the authors do
account for the complex linkages of these industries with the rest of the economy.  For example, they allow
for the fact that automobile production uses steel as an input and they allow for the fact that other sectors of
the economy (such as agriculture, other manufacturing, and services) compete for labor with the industries
under study.
20.  It should be noted that the benefits are true social benefits resulting from efficiency gains and quota rent
capture by the U.S. economy, whereas the costs as measured by de Melo and Tan may be private, but not
social costs. For example, a worker who experiences a reduction in his wage because his skills are no longer
in demand bears a private cost.  However, this is not a social loss if his wage is a true reflection  of how
society values his skills.  Therefore, the ratio of seventeen to one may be an understatement of the ratio of
social benefits to social costs.  An additional reason for believing this figure to be understated stems from
the fact that the authors did not account for the growth of the benefits of liberalization over time, nor did
they account for the fact that the benefits persist indefinitely.
21.  This figure contrasts with the work of Bale (1976), who interviewed American workers who were displaced
by trade  liberalization between  1969 and  1970.  Based  on his  interviews, Bale  calculated the  average
duration of unemployment of 31 weeks for this group of trade-impacted workers.
22.  As  the  Takacs  and  Winters  suggest, this  wage  may  overstate  or  understate  the  true  social  cost  of
unemployment.  For example, the true value of a worker's skills should be measured by the wage that he
could earn in his next best alternative employment. The social cost of unemployment is then overestimated
to the extent that this next best alternative is lower than his wage prior to becoming unemployed.  On the
other hand, their measure may understate the social cost of unemployment since aggregate turnover rates
may mask important differences anong  groups of workers.  For example, men tend to perform very specific
tasks in the shoe industry, while women tend to perform others.  Suppose that the turnover rate for women is
much higher than for men.  In reality, any men displaced due to  liberalization could be  expected to be
unemployed for a much longer duration than women.
23.  Once again the authors remind us that the benefits of liberalization persist indefinitely, while the adjustment
costs terminate once all adjustments have been made.  Assuming a discount rate of 7% for consistency with
Magee (1972) and de Melo and Tarr (1990), the benefit-cost ratio would rise to 2,193!38
24.  One weakness  of this study  is that it ignores  new entrants  into the labor  market. That is, in a steady  state,
new entrants  replace  the workers  exiting  the industry. These new entrants  must then have longer  spells of
unemployment  if trade-displaced  workers  now replace  the exiting  workers.
25.  The numbers  reported  here compare  the standard  efficiency  gains  with  the direct  costs of labor adjustment.
That is, they ignore  the possibility  that  a decline  in  the motor  vehicle  sector  might  initiate  a further  decline  in
the iron and  steel sector.
26.  Of those finding  employment,  20 percent  obtained  jobs in the formal  sector,  with the remainder  becoming
self-employed  or taking  jobs in  the informal  sector.
27.  This figure, measured as of November 1992, was derived by  extrapolating  from the rate at  which
unemployed  workers  were finding  jobs. The  projected  duration  of unemployment  was only  7 months  when
measured  in  February  1991.
28.  Liedholn and Meade suggest that the typical start-up rate for  MSEs in  industrialized  countries is
approximately  ten percent. They  also  report  that the failure  rate for MSEs  is also very high. In particular,
the rate of closures  in the Dominican  Republic  (the only country  for which accurate  data exists) was in
excess  of twenty  percent  during  the early 1990s.
29.  They define  a displaced  worker as one "whose  job loss results from the plant closings  and mass layoffs
associated  with  economic  restructuring"  (Jacobson,  et al. 1993b).
30.  These  wage  differences  refer to  the actual  wage  at a point  in time compared  with  the wage  the worker  would
have  been  expected  to have  earned  had he or she  not been  displaced.
31.  Only one  third  of displaced  workers  found  re-employment  during  the period.
32.  The average  duration  of unemployment  can be calculated  from the data that Mills and Sahn  (1995)  present
in their Table  9.
33.  For example,  during  macroeconomic  crises,  real wages  in Argentina,  Bolivia,  Chile,  and Mexico  fell by 33
percent or more before  recovering  (World  Development  Report,  1995). It is unclear  how much if any of
these  wage  reductions  were due  to trade  reform.
34.  See O'Leary  (1997).
35.  See World  Development  Report  (1995),  Box 17.1.
36.  O'Leary (1995)  discusses  the measurement  of the effectiveness  of labor  market  programs  in Hungary  and
Poland.
37.  The macro-reforms  reduced  inflation  and  resulted  in a real  exchange  rate  that  was not overvalued,  which
helped  to encourage  foreign  direct  investment.  These  factors  combined  with encouragement  of export
processing  zones  resulted  in an increase  of the number  of firms in  these  zones  from 115  in 1982  to 591  in
1988.  Although  comprehensive  trade  reform  was not implemented  in  the 1980s  in  Mauritius,  value  added
and employment  in the export  processing  zones  dramatically  expanded  following  the reforms.
Unemployment,  which  had been  about 15 percent  in the early 1980s  disappeared  and investors  began
worrying  about  a labor  shortage  in the early  1990s. The  percentage  of households  below  the poverty  line
fell from  40 percent  in 1975  to 11  percent  in 1992  and the Gini  coefficient  fell from  42 to 35 in  the same
period (World  Bank, 1995a,  70-71).  This  was  primarily  due to a reduction  in unemployment,  but partly  due
to an increase  in real  wages.
38.  See Ebrill  et al. (forthcoming).  Trade  taxes  as a percent  of GDP  were: 5.3
percent in Africa,  4.4 percent  in  Asia, and  3.5  percent  in the Middle  East.
39.  See Tanzi (1988)  for further  elaboration.  The experience  of Latin America  after 1985 indicates  that trade
reform can be expected  to lead to revenue  loss (unless  compensated  by geographically  neutral  taxes) when
trade reform  starts  from a position  of already  low  tariffs  (International  Monetary  Fund, 1998)..
40.  The comparison  is between  the average  annual  value  of foreign  trade  taxes as a percent of GDP during  the
years 1986-89  with the same  measure  for the years 1978-82. See  Table  3.6  of World  Bank (1992)
41.  A country  was considered  to have implemented  substantial  reform  if there was any real depreciation  of the
exchange rate combined with a substantial  reduction  in the antiexport  bias of commercial  policy or a
minimum  20 percent real depreciation  of the exchange  rate accompanied  by a moderate  reduction  in the
antiexport  bias  of commercial  policy. Moderate  reformers  had real exchange  rate depreciation  less  than  20
percent and moderate  reductions  in the antiexport  bias of commercial  policies,  or mild reductions  in the
antiexport  bias  of cornmercial  policy  combined  with  depreciation  of at least  20 percent,  or real exchange  rate
depreciation  of less than 20 percent combined with substantial reductions  in the  antiexport  bias of
commercial  policies.  All other combinations  of changes in commercial  policy and the exchange  rate39
(including  cases of policy  reversal)  were considered  to be cases  of mild  reform. It should  be recognized  that
there is a certain  degree  of subjectivity  in  this classification  system.
42.  The  term "resource  balance"  is defined  as the net exports  of goods  and  non-factor  services.
43.  A programn  of very  generous  unemployment  benefits  could  reduce  the incentives  for unemployed  workers  to
search for new jobs, thereby extending  the period of unemployment  and increasing  the social costs of
adjustment.40
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Table 1: Employment in Manufacturing during Episodes of Liberalization
(Thousands of Persons)
Episode  Year Before  Average for  Year After
Liberalization  Liberalization  Liberalization
period
Argentina 1 (1967-70)  1,836  1,847  1,914
Argentina 2 (1976-80)  1,863  2,099  2,132
Brazil (1965-73)  1,780  2,182  3,397
Chile 2 (1974-81)  515  487  351
Korea 2 (1978-79)  2,000  2,196  2,099
Peru (1979-80)  675  717  736
Philippines 1 (1960-65)  1,456  1,647  1,825
Philippines 2 (1970-74)  2,056  2,313  2,596
Singapore (1968-73)  61  139  210
Sri Lanka 1 (1968-1970)  74  108  97
Sri Lanka 2 (1977-79)  112  134  155
Turkey 1(1970-73)  485  551  651
Turkey 2 (1980-84)  799  829  not available
Note:  Periods of liberalization are in parentheses.
Source: Table 10 in Papageorgiou, Choksi, Michaely (1990)53
Table  2: Annual  Labor  Growth  Among  Existing  Firms  Under  Liberalization
(percent per annum)
Number of
Employees  All  Ghana  Malawi  Mali  Senegal  Tanzania
countries
1-5  +18  +10  +19  +24  +7  +20
6-20  +11  +6  -3  +20  +12  +10
21-49  +3  +3  +2  +2  0  +3
50+  +1  -9  n.a.  +10  0  +17
All firms  +5  -1  +5  +13  +2  +9
Note: Size categories are based on total employment of the firm at the time of reforms.
Source:  Table  6.2 in Parker,  et al. (1995).54
Table 3: Total Employment  (Thousands)
Czechosl
Year  Costa  . Peru  Poland  Romania  Uruguay
Rica  o-vakia Rica
1982  759.9  8184  n.a.  18208.5  10428.1  n.a.
1983  767.6  8200  n.a.  18374.7  10457.8  n.a.
1984  839.7  8251  n.a.  18383.5  10499.9  932.6
1985  826.7  8317  n.a.  18531.4  10586.1  n.a.
1986  854.2  8379  1988.3  18594.5  10669.5  1021.2
1987  923.3  8409  2061.1  18596.2  10718.6  1090.7
1988  951.2  8449  n.a.  18474.1  10805.4  1103.1
1989  986.8  8431  2169.5  18438.0  10945.7  1134.4
1990  1017.2  8249  n.a.  17552.1  10839.5  1136.2
1991  1006.6  7710  2337.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
n.a. Not Available
Source: Harrison and Revenga (1995) data underlying their Figure 1.55
Table 4:  Estimated Benefit/Cost Ratios Associated with U.S. Import Liberalization
Discount Rate
Number of Years
4%  7%  10%
After Liberalization
1  5.7  5.7  5.7
2  6.3  6.3  6.3
3  7.0  7.0  7.0
4  7.7  7.6  7.6
5  8.3  8.2  8.2
15  25.0  21.8  19.5
Total  60.2  36.1  26.5
Source: Calculated from Magee (1972) Tables 7 and 8.56
Table 5: Characteristics of Micro and Small Scale Enterprises
Dominican
Botswana  Kenya  Lesotho  Malawi  Swaziland  Zimbabwe  Republic
MSE




that are one-  65  47  79  61  69  69  22
person
enterprises




workers* in MSE  39  24  10  18  15  16  36
labor force
Source:  Liedholm  and Meade  (1995), Table  2.1
* Percentage of hired workers refers to percentage of salaried, out of family workers.57
Table 6:  Annual MSE New Starts Rate*
Enterprise Size (number of workers)
Country  Year  1  2-9  10+  Overall
Average
Botswana  1991  32.9  11.5  4.2  25.2
Kenya  1992  33.7  10.3  1.6  21.2
Malawi  1991  26.9  14.1  13.1  21.7
Swaziland  1990  26.3  10.8  2.4  21.7
Zimbabwe  1990  22.8  10.6  18.7  19.3
Dominican  1993  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  20.6
Republic
Source: Liedholm and Meade (1995), Table 3.1.
* Numbers in the table reflect that percentage  of all enterprises  in that category  that were created  in the
specified  year.58
Table 7:  Macroeconomic Indicators Before and After Reform for 24 Countries
3 years  2 years  1 years  Year of  1 year  2 years  3 years
Indicator and  before  before  before  Reform  after  after  after
Country Group  rejbrm  reform  reform  reform  reform  reform
Inflation  Rate
Substantial Reform  31.5  34.3  30.6  55.5  25.9  22.9  22.6
Excluding  30.6  33.0  26.6  48.9  20.3  17.4  17.0
Mexico  12.4  11.8  12.3  9.3  8.9  8.1  7.6
Moderate Reform  15.5  15.7  15.3  17.4  14.8  16.9  19.3
Mild Reform
Fiscal Deficit/GDP
Substantial Reform  -4.8  -6.4  -7.8  -7.2  -6.1  -4.4  -4.6
Excluding  -5.1  -6.4  -6.5  -7.1  -5.9  -3.6  -2.6
Mexico  -7.2  -7.8  -6.0  -5.8  -5.4  -5.1  -4.7
Moderate Reform  -8.0  -6.8  -8.6  -8.9  -8.4  -8.0  -13.8
Mild Reform
Trade Deficit /GDP
Substantial Reform  -5.2  -3.4  -2.5  -1.5  0.4  -0.7  -1.1
Excluding  -5.6  -3.5  -3.6  -3.1  -0.7  -1.5  -1.9
Mexico  -8.8  -8.6  -7.1  -6.4  -7.1  -6.0  -4.4
Moderate Reform  -6.2  -9.9  -7.5  -7.8  -6.4  -6.4  -3.2
Mild Reform
Source:  Thomas and Nash (1991), Table 5-1.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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